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ABSTRACT
This paper and its companion study, Fehr, Jokisch, and Kotlikoff (2004), develop a three-region
dynamic general equilibrium life-cycle model to analyze general and skill-specific immigration
policy during the demographic transition.  The three regions are the U.S., Japan, and the EU.
Immigration is often offered as a solution to the remarkable again underway in the developed world.
Absent an immediate and dramatic change in immigration, dependency ratios will roughly double
over the next three decades placing fiscal institutions, in particular, and economies, in general, under
enormous stress. 
Can immigration alleviate these stresses? The answer is unclear bacause a number of offsetting
factors are at play.  First, increased immigration raises the size of the labor force, but also lowers
real wages.  Hence, the increase in the taxable wage base due to immigration will be less than might
otherwise be expected.  Second, immigrants arrive with some capital and accumulate more capital
as they age.  This raises labor productivity and both payroll and income tax bases.  Third,
immigrants, like natives, require public goods and become eligible for government welfare, health
care, and pension benefits.  
Fiscally speaking, how much one “earns” from a new immigrant depends on the immigant’s skill
level, which, in turn, determines the immigrant’s level of earnings.  The reason is that taxes and
transfer payments are, in general, collected and distributed on a progressive basis. Consequently,
high-skilled immigrants deliver a larger bang for the buck when it comes to paying net taxes (taxes
paid net of transfer payments received).
Our model confirms this point.  Nonetheless, its findings, even with respect to high-skilled
immigration, which we investigate in detail in this paper, are not pretty.  It shows that a significant
expansion of immigration, whether across all skill groups or among particular skill groups, will do
remarkably little to alter the major capital shortage, tax hikes, and reductions in real wages that can












Thanks to decades of low birth rates and rising life expectancies, virtually the entire
developed world is in the process of dramatically aging. In the euro area, for example, the
dependency ratio - the ratio of those aged 65 and over to those aged 15 to 65 – will more than
double by 2040. Given that governments generally ﬁnance the payment of pension and health
care beneﬁts to the elderly by taxing workers, the prospects of much older societies suggests a
tremendous ﬁscal crisis. This is the well-known bad news about the economics of aging. The
question raised here is whether there is some oﬀsetting good news associated with the aging
process. One possible source is capital deepening arising from a rise in the number of elderly
asset holders (suppliers of capital) relative to the number of workers (suppliers of labor). A
second alleged source of economic salvation is expanding immigration.
This paper as well as a companion article, Fehr, Jokisch, and Kotlikoﬀ (2004), upon which
this paper draws, explore both of these potential cures for the developed world’s demographic
woes. Fehr, Jokisch, and Kotlikoﬀ (2004) introduced our model and showed the eﬀects of a
simultaneous doubling of immigration among all skill groups in all three regions. The current
paper considers skill-speciﬁc as well as region-speciﬁc expansions of immigration.
The framework for our analysis is a three-region dynamic overlapping generations general
equilibrium life-cycle model. The three regions are the U.S., Japan, and the EU. There is a single
good that can either be consumed or invested at home or abroad; i.e., there is international
capital mobility. In contrast to capital, labor is not mobile internationally, and immigration to
each region is exogenous.
To preview our conclusions, we ﬁnd that both cures - capital deepening and increased
immigration – are fake elixirs. Indeed, instead of capital deepening, the developed world can
look forward to a signiﬁcant capital shortage that will reduce real wages by one ﬁfth and raise
real interest rates by one half. While there will be more elderly owning and supplying capital
compared to the number of young and middle-aged workers supplying labor, average growth-
adjusted capital holdings per oldster will decline over time. The reason is simple - the huge
2increase in taxes needed along the demographic transition to cover beneﬁt obligations to the
elderly will greatly limit the claims to capital that successive generations bring into retirement.
In the case of immigration, our results suggest a double-edged sword. On the one hand,
more immigrants increase the number of workers and, therefore, the taxable wage base. On
the other hand, more immigrants, particularly low skilled immigrants, demand public goods
as well as transfer payments, neither of which is cheap. According to our model, the costs of
additional immigrants, assuming they have the same distribution of skills as the current immi-
grants, roughly equal the revenue gains they engender. On balance, such a uniform expansion
of immigration makes essentially no diﬀerence to the developed world’s demographic transition
path. On the other hand, if immigration is expanded primarily among the low skilled, ﬁscal
conditions will signiﬁcantly deteriorate. The opposite is true in the case of expanding immigra-
tion among the high skilled. Unfortunately, materially improving the developed world’s future
economic prospects would require massive increases in high-skilled immigrants, all of whom
would have to come from the developing world.
Our paper begins by reviewing the literature and describing the demographic transition
and the structure of the simulation model. Next we discuss the calibration and the baseline
transition path of the economy, which keeps current immigration constant. Then, we quantify
the macroeconomic and welfare eﬀects of alternative unilateral and multilateral immigration
policies.
II. Literature Review
Our model’s closest relative is Kotlikoﬀ, Smetters, and Walliser (2001), which itself de-
scends from the Auerbach-Kotlikoﬀ’s (1987) overlapping generation (OLG) model. Like the
former model, ours examines the demographic transition and incorporates age-speciﬁc fertility,
lifespan extension, intergenerational earnings heterogeneity, and a range of ﬁscal institutions.
But unlike that study, this one includes international capital mobility, lifespan uncertainty, be-
quests arising from incomplete annuitization, capital adjustment costs, and immigration, which
can be either uniform or skill-speciﬁc.
3Demographic transitions in developed countries have generally been analyzed in closed
economy models that ignore immigration and, obviously, international capital mobility. More
recent studies have begun to introduce these elements. The French INGENUE (2002) team
divides the world into six large regions – three developed areas and three developing areas –
each of which has quite diﬀerent demographics. The team reports a small degree of capital
deepening along the global demographic transition. Boersch-Supan, et. al. (2002) set up a
three-region OLG model, featuring Germany, Europe, and the rest of the OECD, to examine
the international ramiﬁcations of alternative German pension reforms. They also ﬁnd very
little change in the capital-labor ratio in their open economy simulations. And Brooks (2003)
simulates the general equilibrium eﬀects of past and current population trends on capital ﬂows
within a model that features eight regions. He ﬁnds that diﬀerences in population trends were
important determinants of international capital ﬂows in the past and predicts that they will be
as important in the future.
Each of these general equilibrium studies omits immigration as a policy instrument. How-
ever, immigration has been addressed in both partial and general equilibrium. Auerbach and
Oreopoulos (1999) and Bonin, et. al. (2000) use generational accounting - a partial equilibrium
framework – to quantify the ﬁscal implications of immigration in the U.S. and Germany, respec-
tively. The U.S. study ﬁnds relatively small ﬁscal eﬀects of expanding immigration, whereas
the German study ﬁnds signiﬁcant eﬀects.
Lundborg and Segerstrom (2002) and Storeletten (2000) provide general equilibrium treat-
ments of immigration. Lundborg and Segerstrom (2002) develop a two-country version of the
endogenous growth model with quality ladders. In their simulations, immigration from the
low-tech (South) to the high-tech (North) country enhances growth in both countries, but re-
duces wages in the destination country. Consequently, native workers in the North lose while
immigrants from the south gain. Due to faster growth, more ﬁrms are driven out of business,
which in turn reduces the stock market value of ﬁrms and hurts capital owners. Since Lundborg
and Segerstrom (2002) apply a stylized inﬁnitely lived-agent model, their study ignores the age
and skill composition of immigrants.
4Such aspects are considered in Storesletten (2000) who investigates the ﬁscal eﬀects of
immigration policies in the U.S. within an extended Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987) model that
has broadly similar features to our own. The diﬀerences between the two models are, however,
important and may help explain our somewhat diﬀerent ﬁndings. In our model, but not in
Storesletten’s, immigrants enter the country with asset holdings that are the same as those of
natives of the same age and skill level. Our model also features age-speciﬁc inheritances, whereas
Storesletten assumes that only young adults receive inheritances. Third, our model features
age-speciﬁc fertility, which we view as critically important to generate a realistic population
age-distributions through time. Fourth, our model takes a period to be a single year, whereas
Storesletten treats a period as ﬁve years. Fifth, Storesletten focuses on increasing high-skilled
immigrants in a very narrow age range, whereas we consider increasing high-skilled immigrants
at all ages. Sixth, our model treats the U.S. as an open economy and captures international
spillovers from multilateral and unilateral changes in immigration policy.
Despite their diﬀerences, both studies reach the same bottom line with respect to a uni-
form expansion of immigration, namely that it will do little to improve the dire ﬁscal ﬁnances
of the United States. Both studies also agree that increasing the number of high-skilled im-
migrants can be beneﬁcial. However, according to our model, even a doubling of high skilled
immigrants would still leave the developed world with a major ﬁscal crisis in its hands.
While increasing skilled immigration sounds easy, this is not likely to be the case. The
reason is that most skilled workers live in the U.S., the EU, and Japan. Moving a high skilled
worker from one of these regions to another is a zero-sum game. The alternative – luring high
skilled workers from developing countries to the developed world - will greatly exacerbate the
brain drain that is already greatly depleting the human capital of developing countries.
III. Modelling the World Economy1
Like other dynamic life-cycle models featuring fertility, our model features monozygotic
reproduction. But to achieve a realistic pattern of births by age, we follow Kotlikoﬀ, et al.
1This section draws heavily on Fehr, Jokisch and Kotlikoﬀ (2004).
5(2001) in assuming that agents in their child-bearing years give birth each year to fractions
of children. As a consequence, each agent’s household size and structure is changing over the
life-cycle. Since agents in our model care about their children’s utility when they are young
and spend more on consumption when their kids are at home, our model delivers a rise in
the longitudinal age-consumption proﬁle during child-rearing years. In addition, by specifying
how age-speciﬁc fertility rates change through time, we can line up our model’s age-speciﬁc
population counts of children and workers fairly closely with those forecast for the three regions.
With respect to the life span uncertainty, we assume that agents die with realistic mor-
tality probabilities starting at age 68. Agents, in our model, fully appreciate the uncertainty of
their longevities and maximize, at any point in time, their expected remaining lifetime utilities.
The inclusion of lifespan uncertainty provides three advantages in addition to getting agents
to die on time. First, it permits a more realistic modelling of bequests and inheritances. The
standard method for including bequests in dynamic simulation models is to tack on an extra
element to the lifetime utility function that depends on the level of bequests. Our approach here
is quite diﬀerent. We generate bequests by assuming, realistically, that agents fail to annuitize
their assets in old age. Hence, when they die, they leave undesired bequests to their children.
This treatment of bequests ﬁnds support in a recent study by Gokhale, Kotlikoﬀ, Sefton, and
Weale (2001), which shows that undesired bequests can explain both the level, Gini coeﬃcient,
and skewness of bequests in the U.S.
The second advantage involves the age-distributions of bequests and inheritances. With
the exception of De Nardi, ˙ Imrohoroˇ glu, and Sargent (1999), previous modelling of bequests in
dynamic models have assumed that all agents die at a given age and all agents inherit at a given
age. In our model, agents die at diﬀerent ages, based on realistic mortality probabilities, and
their heirs inherit at diﬀerent ages. Older heirs who were born when the parents were young
receive inheritances later in their life than their younger siblings. The third advantage of incor-
porating uninsurable lifespan uncertainty is that it leads to a gradual decline in consumption
in old age. This is another feature of actual longitudinal age-consumption proﬁles.
Our model also includes capital adjustment costs. As is well known, these costs can
6drive temporary wedges between the marginal products of capital in diﬀerent regions and lead
the market values of capital assets to temporarily diﬀer from their replacement costs. Thus
inclusion of adjustment costs in the model generates what amounts to regional stock markets
and permits us to explore how aging and immigration policy aﬀect stock prices through time.
A ﬁnal feature of our framework worth ﬂagging is the intra-cohort disaggregation. As in
Fehr (2000) and Kotlikoﬀ, et. al. (2001), we distinguish three income classes with diﬀerent
earnings abilities within each generation. Immigrants are also split into these income classes
so that we can simulate the arrival of immigrants with diﬀerent stocks of human and physical
capital.
We now provide an overview of our model. A more detailed description of the model,
including its population projections, data sources, assumptions, and calibration, is provided in
Fehr, et. al. (2003).
1. Demographics
Each region is populated by households who live up to a maximum age of 90. Conse-
quently, there are 91 generations with surviving members at any point in time. The individual
life cycle of a representative agent is described in Figure 1. Between ages 0 and 20 our agents
are children who earn no money and are supported by their parents. At age 21 our agents
leave their parents and go to work. Between ages 23 and 45 our agents give birth to fractions
of children at the beginning of each period, i.e. the ﬁrst (fraction of) children are born when
the agents are 23 and the last are born when they are age 45. An agent’s ﬁrst-born children
(fractions of children) leave home when the parents are age 43, while the last-born leave when
the agents are age 66. Our agents die between ages 68 and 90. The probability of death is one
at age 91. Children always outlive their parents, meaning that parents always outlive grand-
parents. To see this note that if a parent reaches age 90, his or her oldest children will be 67.
These are children who were born when the parent was age 23.
In each year new immigrants in each skill and age group arrive with the same number
and age distribution of children and the same level of assets as natives with the same skill and
7of the same age. Since the demographic structure is identical across countries, it suﬃces in the
following to concentrate on a representative country and omit country indices.
To specify the current and future demographic structure of each region we start with the
year-2000 age-speciﬁc population [N(a,2000)] and age-speciﬁc net-immigration [NM(a,2000)]
counts. To determine the evolution over time of population in each region, we applied region-
and age-speciﬁc mortality [d(a,i)] and birth rates to the cohorts alive in year 2000 as well as
to their children as they reach their ages of fertility and mortality.
In constructing existing as well as future age-population counts, we have to link each
initial cohort between the ages of 1 and 68 to those of their parents who are still alive. The
reason is that children receive bequests from their parents and the levels and timing of these
inheritances depend on the ages of their parents. This linkage is achieved by applying past
fertility rates to each cohort under age 69 in year 2000. If, for example, 15 percent of the
parents of newborns in 1980 were 25 years old, then 15 percent of the 20-year-olds in year
2000 are assigned to parents age 45. In addition, each cohort is split into three income classes
k. Speciﬁcally, we assume that 30 percent of each cohort belong to the lowest income class,
10 percent to the top income class, and the remaining 60 percent to the middle income class.
Formally, we denote the ﬁnal population vector for year 2000 as N(a,2000,s,k)where a =
1,...,90, s = 23,...,45, k = 1,2,3. The term s references the age of the parent at the time
of birth of agents age a in 2000.
We use the population age structure in year 2000 as well as projected future fertility,
mortality, and net-immigration rates to compute the population vector N(a,t,s,k) for the
years t between 2001 and 2050. After year 2050, mortality and net immigration rates are kept
constant and fertility rates are endogenously adjusted in order to achieve a stable population
age structure in the future. In the baseline path, we assume annual net-immigration of 1
million per year in the US, 450,000 in the EU, and 54,000 in Japan. Figures 2 and 3 report our
projected life expectancy and the fertility rates in the three regions between 2000 and 2100.
Our exogenous predictions of the current and future mortality and fertility rates follow
8the medium variant of United Nations Population Division (UNPD) (2003). While mortality is
decreasing in all three regions until 2050, the Japanese have signiﬁcantly higher life expectancy
than do Americans or EU citizens. Since our model’s agents don’t die prior to age 68, our
agent’s life expectancies at birth are higher than the actual values. However, the model’s life
expectancies conditional on reaching age 60 are close to those reported by the UNDP (2003).
Total fertility rates are currently much higher in the U.S. than in Japan or in Europe.
While the Japanese and European rates are predicted to increase until 2050, the U.S. rate is
expected to remain at close to its current value. The drop in the U.S. fertility rate starting
in 2050 reﬂects our assumption of zero population growth in all three regions after that year.
In the U.S. the high rate of immigration, which we assume continues after 2050, requires a
reduction in the fertility rate after 2050 to achieve zero population growth2. Figures 4 and 5
report the resulting change in the total population and the dependency ratio.
Due to its relatively high fertility and immigration rates, the U.S. population increases
from 275 million in 2000 to 505 million in 2100. In Europe, the total population falls over the
century from 375 to 340 million. And in Japan, the population falls from 126 million to only
83 million! As one would expect, dependency ratios are increasing in all three regions up to
2050. However, the three regions experience important diﬀerences in their population aging.
First, the increase in the dependency ratio is much greater in Japan and Europe than in the
US. Second, dependency ratios fall in Europe and Japan after peaking in year 2050, while they
remain roughly stable after 2030 in the US.
As agents age, their household compositions change as they have more children and as
older children reach adulthood. These changes materially alter consumption and saving deci-
sions. Given age a of an agent in income class k in a speciﬁc year t, the number of her children
2Alternatively, one could also keep fertility almost constant and eliminate immigration after 2050. The
baseline path after 2050 would not change qualitatively, but national income, capital stock and eﬀective labor








23 ≤ a ≤ 65, k = 1,2,3, (1)
where u = max(0;a − 45) and m = min(20,a − 23). Recall that agents younger than 23 have
no children and those over 65 have only adult children, i.e. KID(a,t,k) = 0 for 0 ≤ a ≤ 22
and 66 ≤ a ≤ 90. Agents in between these ages have children. Take, for example, a 30 year-old
agent. Such an agent has children who were born in the years (a−j) in the years since she/he
was 23. In year t, these children are between age 0 ≤ j ≤ 7. The kids function (1) sums the
total number of kids of the respective parent-income class generation and divides it by the total
number of parents of age a in year t who belong to income class k. The KID-function (1) takes
into account that the family’s age structure will change over time due to changing fertility. Our
approach also permits the distribution of births by the age of parents to change over time. This
is an important improvement compared to Kotlikoﬀ, et. al. (2001).
2. Preferences and Household Budget Constraints
As previously mentioned, we do not distinguish between natives and immigrants in the
model once the immigrants have joined the native earnings- and age-speciﬁc cohorts. The
model’s preference structure is represented by a time-separable, nested, CES utility function.
Remaining lifetime utility U(j,t,s,k) of a generation of age j at time t whose parents were age
s at time of birth and who belongs to income class k takes the form
U(j,t,s,k) = V (j,t,s,k) + H(j,t,s,k), (2)
where V (j,t,s,k) records the agent’s utility from her/his own goods and leisure consumption
and H(j,t,s,k) denotes the agent’s utility from the consumption of her/his children. The two



































10where c(a,i,s,k) and `(a,i,s,k) denote consumption and leisure, respectively and i is deﬁned
as i = t+a−j. The children’s consumption of income class k parents who are age a at period
i and whose parents were age s at the time of their birth is deﬁned as cK(a,i,s,k). Note that
the number of children is independent of the grandparents’ age at the time of the birth of the
parents.
Since lifespan is uncertain, the utility of consumption in future periods is weighted with




[1 − d(u,u − a + i)], (5)
which is determined by multiplying the conditional survival probabilities from year t (when the
agents age is j) up to year i. Note that d(j,t) is the mortality probability of an agent age j in year
t. The parameters θ,ρ,α and γ represent the “pure” rate of time preference, the intratemporal
elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure at each age a, the leisure preference
parameter, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure in
diﬀerent years, respectively.
Given the asset endowment a(j,t,s,k) of the agent in year t, maximization of (2) is
subject to a lifetime budget constraint deﬁned by the sequence:




(1 + r(t)) + w(t)E(a,k)[h(a,t) − `(a,t,s,k)]
− T(j,t,s,k) − c(j,t,s,k) − KID(j,t,k)cK(j,t,s,k), (6)
where r(t) is the pre-tax return on savings and I(j,t,s,k) denotes the inheritance the agent
receives in year t. When the parents die between age 68 and 90, their remaining assets are split
between their children. Consequently, inheritances of agents who are age j in year t and whose
parents were age s at their birth are deﬁned as follows:
I(j,t,s,k) =
d(j + s) ¯ A(j + s,t,k)
P45
u=23 N(j + s − u,t,u,k)
. (7)
The numerator deﬁnes the aggregate assets of income class k parents who die in year t at
age j + s. The denominator deﬁnes these parents’ total number of children who are between
11ages j + s − 45 and j + s − 23 in year t. The receipt of inheritances requires us to distinguish
members of each cohort according to the ages of their parents at birth. The parents’ ages at
death determine when the children receive their inheritances. While the ﬁrst children of parents
(born when their parents were age 23) receive their inheritances between ages 45 and 67, the
last-born children (born when their parents were age 45) receive their inheritances earlier in
life, between ages 23 and 45.
As in Altig et al. (2001) and Kotlikoﬀ et al. (2001), we assume that technical progress
causes the time endowment h(·) of each successive generation to grow at the rate λ, i.e.
h(a,i) = (1 + λ)h(a,i − 1). (8)
Gross labor income of the agent in year t is derived as the product of her/his labor supply
and her/his wage rate. The latter is the product of the gross wage rate w(t) in period t and





ξ(1) = 0.2, ξ(2) = 1.0, ξ(3) = 5.0 (9)
The middle-income class proﬁle is taken from Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987, 52). The shift
parameters ξ(k) are then applied to derive income class-speciﬁc proﬁles. Moreover, since tech-
nological change is an important determinant of secular growth over the life cycle, we add this
growth by multiplying the age-speciﬁc longitudinal earnings ability proﬁle by the term involv-
ing λ. Hence, the longitudinal age-wage proﬁle is steeper the greater is the rate of technological
change.
The net taxes T(j,t,s,k) of an agent in year t consist of consumption, capital income,
and progressive wage taxes as well as social security contributions net of pensions. Due to a
contribution ceiling, pension, disability insurance and health-care contribution rates may diﬀer
across agents. Each agent’s pension beneﬁts depend on her/his pre-retirement earnings history,
while health care and disability transfers are provided on a per capita basis to all eligible age
groups.
12Given individual consumption, leisure, and asset levels of all agents, we can compute the
aggregate variables. For example, aggregate value of assets A(t + 1) in period t is computed
from











Since households die at the beginning of each period, we have to aggregate across all agents
who lived in the previous period in order to compute ¯ A(a + 1,t + 1,k), which we need for the
calculation of bequests, see (7). If we aggregate across agents who live in period t + 1, i.e.,







a(a,t + 1,s,k)N(a,t + 1,s,k) (11)
assets of the arriving immigrants of period t + 1 are included.









E(a,k)[h(a,t) − `(a,t,s,k)]N(a,t,s,k). (12)
3. The Government Sector
The consolidated government issues new debt ∆B(t) and collects net-taxes in order to








T(a,t,s,k)N(a,t,s,k) = G(t) + r(t)B(t). (13)
With respect to public debt, we assume that the government maintains an exogenously ﬁxed
ratio of debt to output. The progressivity of the wage tax system is modelled as in Auerbach
and Kotlikoﬀ (1987). Speciﬁcally, marginal wage tax rates rise linearly with the tax base.
PY (t) deﬁnes the aggregate payroll tax base, which diﬀers from total labor earnings due
to the ceiling on taxable wages. This ceiling is ﬁxed at twice average income in the U.S. and
EU and at 168 percent of average income in Japan. Aggregate average social security payroll
13tax rates ˆ τp, ˆ τh and ˆ τd are computed each period from the relevant budget constraint for the
program and region in question. For the U.S., we determine the separate values of payroll
tax rates for the Social Security pension system, Medicare, and the Social Security disability
insurance systems, i.e.
ˆ τ
p(t)PY (t) = PB(t) ˆ τ
h(t)PY (t) = HB(t) and ˆ τ
d(t)PY (t) = DB(t) (14)
where PB(t),HB(t) and DB(t) are total outlays of the pension, health care, and disability
systems, respectively. In the EU and Japan, disability insurance is part of their respective
state pension systems. Hence, we do not calculate separate disability insurance payroll tax
rates for those regions.
Due to contribution ceilings, individual pension and health insurance payroll tax rates
can diﬀer from the payroll tax rate. Above the contribution ceiling, marginal social security
contributions are zero and average social security contributions fall with the agent’s income. To
accommodate this non-convexity of the budget constraint, we assume that the highest earnings
class in each region pays pension and in the EU and Japan, health insurance payroll taxes, up
to the relevant ceilings, but faces no pension and no health care payroll taxes at the margin.
The other earnings classes are assumed to face the full statutory rate on all earnings. In the
U.S., the disability payroll tax is modelled in an equivalent manner. However, since there is
no ceiling on U.S. Medicare taxes, all earnings groups are assumed to face the health insurance
payroll tax at the margin.
If a k-income class agent, whose parents were s years old at his birth, retires in year z at
the exogenously set retirement age ¯ a(z), her/his pension beneﬁts Pen(a,i,s,k) in years i ≥ z
when he is age a ≥ ¯ a(z) depend linearly on her/his average earnings during his working time
¯ W(z,s,k):
Pen(a,i,s,k) = ω0 + ω1 × ¯ W(z,s,k). (15)
The region-speciﬁc parameters ω0,ω1 were chosen in order to approximate the replacement
rates relative to individual lifetime earnings as reported in Whitehouse (2002).
General government expenditures G(t) consist of government purchases of goods and ser-
14vices, including educational expenditures and health outlays. Over the transition, government
purchases of goods and services are held ﬁxed per capita with an adjustment for annual tech-
nological change. Age-speciﬁc education, health, and disability outlays are also held ﬁxed over
the transition with the same adjustment for technological change. The government’s budget
(13) is balanced each year by adjusting the intercept on our linear formula for the average wage
tax rate.
4. Production
The economy is populated by a large number of identical ﬁrms, the total number of which





where K(t) is aggregate capital in period t, ε is capital’s share in production, and φ is a
technology parameter. Since we posit convex capital adjustment cost, the ﬁrms’ marketable
output in year t, Y (t), is given by the diﬀerence between gross output and adjustment costs,
i.e.
Y (t) = F(K(t),L(t)) − 0.5 ψ ∆K(t)
2/K(t) (17)
where ∆K(t) measures investment in year t. The term ψ is the adjustment cost coeﬃcient.
Larger values of ψ imply higher marginal costs of new capital goods for a given rate of invest-
ment. The installation technology is linear homogeneous and shows increasing marginal cost
of investment (or, symmetrically, disinvestment): faster adjustment requires a greater than
proportional rise in adjustment costs.
We abstract from any taxation at the corporate level. Arbitrage between new and existing
capital, therefore, implies that the latter has a price per unit of
q(t + 1) = 1 + ψ ∆K(t)/K(t) (18)
Similarly, the arbitrage condition arising from proﬁt maximization requires identical re-
15turns to ﬁnancial and real investments.
r(t)q(t) = FK(t) + 0.5 ψ (∆K(t)/K(t))
2 + q(t + 1) − q(t) (19)
The left side gives the return on a ﬁnancial investment of amount q(t), while the return on one
unit of real capital investment is the net return to capital (which includes the marginal product
of capital FK(t) plus the reduction in marginal adjustment costs) and capital gains.
5. World Equilibrium
Up to now we’ve described the model for the representative economy. In the open economy
case, the aggregate value of world assets equals the market value of the world-wide capital stock









, with W = {U.S.,EU,Japan}. (20)
6. Solving the Model
To solve the model we ﬁrst need to specify the preference, technology, and policy param-
eters. Table 1 reports our main parameter values. The preference and technology parameters
are mostly taken from Kotlikoﬀ, et. al. (2001). The reported debt levels in USA, Europe and
Japan were chosen to match real interest payments reported in European Commission (2003)
for the year 2000, while the retirement ages are taken from Bloendal and Scarpetta (1999) for
the US and the EU and from Whitehouse (2002) for Japan. The consumption tax rate for
the US is taken from Kotlikoﬀ, et. al. (2001). For the EU, the consumption tax rate is the
unweighted average of the indirect tax rates in the member states. In the case of Japan, the
consumption tax rate is set at the current value of the VAT. In addition, we specify the progres-
sive parameters of the wage tax systems in each region in order to generate realistic average and
marginal tax rates (reported below), while the proportional term is computed endogenously so
that the government budget is balanced by the wage tax.
In calibrating our model, we use a Japanese age-speciﬁc government health care expen-
ditures proﬁles for Japan. In the case of the EU, we use the German proﬁle. For the U.S.,
16the Medicare program applies only to households older than 65. We assume uniform Medicare
expenditures by age among those over age 65. We make the same uniform age-distribution
assumption with respect to the U.S. disability system, which we assume applies to only those
under age 65.
We use the German age-speciﬁc education proﬁle for all regions in the model and rescale
it to get realistic education outlays in year 2000 in each region (see below). In addition to these
parameter values, our model requires an initial distribution of assets by age and income class
for each region. These proﬁles are region-speciﬁc.3
To run our model as an open world economy, we also need to specify how aggregate world
assets are distributed across regions. These world asset shares were chosen to generate realistic
current accounts vis a vis the other regions for our initial year. Finally, we have to specify
the capital stocks in each region in our initial year 2000 in each region. Here we take the
endogenous initial-year values that arise from a simulation without adjustment costs.
Given the initial world capital stock and asset proﬁles, our model applies a Gauss-Seidel
algorithm to solve for the perfect foresight general equilibrium transition path of the economy.
Our algorithm starts with initial guesses for the capital stocks and labor supplies in each
region for the remaining years of the transition. Next we compute from equation (18) the
path of region-speciﬁc market prices of capital. The path for the world interest rate after 2000
is derived from the arbitrage condition (19) for the U.S. This condition (19) is also used to
update values of the existing capital stock in year 2000 in each region. Next, the wage rates are
computed in each region by setting them equal to their respective marginal products of labor.
From the capital market equilibrium condition (20) we derive aggregate initial asset holdings
in year 2000, apply the region-speciﬁc saving shares, and update age-speciﬁc asset holdings in
2000 in each region. Given these initial assets, the time path of tax rates (which are based
on guesses in the ﬁrst iteration) and factor prices, household decisions on consumption and
3Data on Japanese asset proﬁles were provided by Charles Horioka, while the European proﬁles were adjusted
from German data provided by Reinhold Schnabel. U.S. Data were derived from the 1998 Survey of Consumer
Finances.
17labor supply are computed and aggregated. Then we update the path for wage tax rates, the
social security payroll tax rate, and debt given the government budget constraints (13) and
(14). Finally, we compute new paths for the capital stocks in each region using the capital
market equilibrium condition (20) as well as (18). The new values for capital and labor are
then weighted with the initial guesses of these supplies to form guesses of the time paths of these
variables. The algorithm then iterates until the path of capital stock and labor converges. We
give our economy 300 years to reach to a steady state. Our model in fact reaches a steady state
to many decimal places prior to year 300. It also converges very tightly around the equilibrium
transition path.
IV. Initial Equilibrium and the World Economy’s Baseline Transition Path
Table 2 reports the macroeconomic variables in 2000 in the three regions. Note that there
is a fairly close accordance between actual and computed national income account measures of
private consumption and government purchases. The one exception here is Japanese govern-
ment purchases. The oﬃcial data seem too high given the reported ratio of tax revenues to
national income. In our calibration, we chose to benchmark government purchases based on
the ratio of tax revenues to national income.
The reported shares in education, pensions and health are very close to actual levels4.
The same applies to the social security payroll tax rates and the level and progressivity of the
income tax in the U.S. and EU. On the other hand, the average wage tax rate in Japan is high.
Since we have assumed a fairly low consumption tax rate in Japan (see table 1), tax revenues
from indirect taxes are too low in Japan5. Finally, the model’s year-2000 capital-output ratios
seem reasonable not only with reference to U.S. Commerce Department ﬁgures, but also in
terms of the year-2000 interest rate, which equals 9.0 percent. Having said this, we point out
below that calibrating the model to a lower initial capital-output ratio will alter the extent
to which simulated capital-labor ratios decline and real wages fall over the develop world’s
transition path.
4See European Commission (2003), Dang et al. (2001, 26), IPSS (2003, 3) and OECD (2002, 178 and 2003).
5In future research we plan to improve this calibration.
18We now turn to our simulated baseline policy transition paths for the three regions, which
are reported in the upper panels of tables 3 to 5 for the U.S., EU and Japan. The ﬁndings
here are not pleasant. First, rather than enjoying the economic fruits of capital deepening, the
developed world experiences a major capital shortage - one that lowers real wages per unit of
human capital by almost one ﬁfth between now and the end of this century! The corresponding
century-long increase in real interest rates is 440 basis points.
The explanation for this predicted capital shortage lies in the last two columns of the
charts. There we see combined social insurance payroll tax and wage tax rates rising by 73
percent in the U.S., 66 percent in the EU, and by 64 percent in Japan. These tax hikes
dramatically reduce the ability of workers in the developed world to save over the course of this
century. By 2100, the combined payroll plus average wage tax rate equals 40.7 percent in the
U.S., 67.7 percent in the EU, and 63.3 percent in Japan.
One way to gauge the importance of ﬁscal policy to this ﬁnding is to turn oﬀ the social
security, disability, and health care programs and rerun the baseline simulation. Doing so
reduces the severity of the capital shortage by roughly half; i.e., the decline in real wages over
the transition is roughly half of what arises when these social insurance programs are in place.
We also reran this baseline simulation assuming an initial capital-output ratio of 2.5 in
each region. The year-2000 interest rate in this case is 10.0 percent and the real wage declines
over the century by only 6 percent over the century rather than the 19 percent decline reported
in tables 3 to 5. In the absence of social insurance programs, this alternatively calibrated model
generates a long-run crowding in of capital that raises the 2100 real wage by 5.0 percent6. So
the key message here is that regardless of the initial capital-labor ratio to which one calibrates,
the presence of social insurance programs can substantially limit the amount of crowding in of
capital that would otherwise arise due to the aging of developed economies.
Although each of the regions experience the same reduction in real wages and dramatic tax
increases, there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences with respect to overall economic growth. In the U.S.,
6We’re currently double checking these results in the closed and open economies.
19national income grows by a factor of 4.1 over the century. In the EU, it grows by a factor of 2.2.
And in Japan, it grows by a factor of only 1.4. The explanation here is major diﬀerences across
the regions in the growth of eﬀective labor supply. Although each region experiences the same
technological change, which permits greater eﬀective labor supply by each successive cohort,
the absolute number of workers grow at much diﬀerent rates in the three regions. Indeed, in
Japan and the EU the reduction in population size means a reduction over time in the absolute
numbers of workers in those regions. The base case run also suggests a major rise in stock
values over the course of the century. This is to be expected given the capital scarcity arising
along the transition path. Note that the long run value of q is 1.1 in all regions of the model.
V. Immigration Policy
In this section we consider the macroeconomic and welfare eﬀects of ﬁve alternative im-
migration policies: doubling immigration in all three regions, doubling immigration in just the
U.S., doubling low-skilled immigration in just the U.S., doubling high-skilled immigration just
in the U.S., and doubling the number of elderly immigrants in the U.S.
1. Doubling of Immigration in All Three Regions
The second panels in tables 3 through 5 show the impacts of immediately and permanently
doubling immigration in all three regions. As is clear from the ﬁgures for eﬀective labor supply,
doubling immigration makes a material diﬀerence to the long-run supply of labor in all three
regions. Relative to the baseline simulation, this policy raises eﬀective labor supply in 2100 by
31 percent in the U.S., by 21 percent in the EU, and by 11 percent in Japan. The remarkable
thing is how long it takes for immigration to materially alter eﬀective labor supplies. In the
U.S., for example, the eﬀective supply of labor is only 13 percent larger in 2030 despite a
doubling of immigration starting in 2000. The comparable ﬁgures for the EU and Japan are 6
percent and 2 percent.
Given that the developed world’s severe ﬁscal problems associated with aging will begin
to appear well before 2030, it would seem that even a doubling of immigration is ”‘too little
too late”’. This, indeed, is what the other ﬁgures in the second panel of results show. Relative
20to the baseline simulation, doubling immigration makes little diﬀerence to any of the three
countries in terms of their macroeconomic variables.
Take the U.S. In 2030 the social insurance payroll tax rate is 21.5 percent with a doubling
of immigration, which is not much lower than the 23.1 percent rate without the extra immi-
grants. In 2100 the payroll tax rate is 26.7 percent, compared with 27.4 percent under base-case
immigration policy. Factor prices are also essentially unchanged by a doubling of immigration.
In 2030, the pre-tax wage is .88 compared with .90 in the base case. And in 2100, the pre-tax
wage is .81 in both simulations. The explanation here is that while the long-run U.S. labor
supply rises by 31 percent, the long-run capital stock rises by 33 percent, leaving the long-run
capital-labor ratio essentially unchanged.
If the long-run real wage in the U.S. stays ﬁxed, but labor supply rises by 31 percent, why
doesn’t the payroll tax rate and, for that matter, the average wage tax rate fall by 31 percent in
light of the 31 percent larger long-run supply of eﬀective labor? The answer is that the model
provides new immigrants with public goods and social insurance beneﬁts on the same basis as
existing natives. And doubling the number of immigrants on an across-the-board basis ends up
costing the U.S. government almost as much in additional expenditures as the U.S. government
earns in additional revenues. As tables 4 and 5 indicate, the same can be said of the EU and
Japan.
Table 6 reports the welfare eﬀects from doubling immigration. The numbers show the
change in welfare measured as an equivalent variation and expressed as a percentage of re-
maining lifetime resources for cohorts born between 1910 and 2030. Almost all cohorts realize
welfare gains, albeit mostly very small ones, from the doubling of immigration. The elderly
mainly beneﬁt from the increased capital prices. Initially younger and future generations gain
from the reduction in payroll taxes. The gains are smaller for members of the high-skilled class
because the ceiling on key payroll taxes limits the beneﬁts they can experience from cuts in
these taxes.
Welfare gains are generally higher in the EU and Japan. This is particularly true of
21younger and future cohorts. Indeed, for the EU low-skilled cohort born in 2030, the welfare
gain is 5.85 percent in the EU, 3.40 percent in Japan, and only 1.58 percent in the U.S. Unlike
the gains of initial older generations, these gains are substantial. They appear to reﬂect the
reduction in excess burden arising from even the modest reductions in marginal tax rates arising
from the immigration reform. As is well known, the size of the eﬃciency gain from reducing
eﬀective marginal tax rates depends on their initial level. And in the EU and Japan, base-case
eﬀective marginal tax rates are much higher than they are in the U.S.
2. Doubling Immigration in the U.S.
In the third panel of tables 3-5, we consider doubling immigration, but only in the U.S.
The goals here number two. First, we want to assess possible spillovers across regions from
unilateral immigration policy. Second, we want to examine what may be the most likely
immigration policy response to the demographic transition, namely a major expansion of U.S.
immigration, with little or no change in EU or Japanese immigration. The reason we view
this to be most likely is that the U.S. appears much more open to immigration than the other
regions.
As a comparison of panels 2 and 3 in table 3 indicates, doubling immigration just in the
U.S. makes almost no diﬀerence to the U.S. transition compared with doubling immigration
in all three regions. There is also little impact on the EU or Japan of this policy as can be
conﬁrmed by comparing panels 1 and 3 for those two counties in tables 4 and 5. This makes
sense. As we’ve seen, doubling immigration has even in the long run only little eﬀect on the
world-wide capital-labor ratio. Hence, conducting this policy in the U.S. makes little diﬀerence
to the one channel by which it could aﬀect the EU and Japan, namely the developed world’s
degree of capital intensivity. The fact that both asset accumulation and labor supply rise in
roughly the same proportion in the U.S. also explains why this policy only increases the ﬂows of
capital from the US to the EU and Japan slightly as measured by the later two region’s current
accounts. The ﬁnal piece of evidence conﬁrming the small size of international spillovers from
unilateral changes in immigration is given in table 7. There we see welfare changes for the U.S.
that are very close to those in table 6, whereas those for the EU and Japan are small, especially
22in the short and medium run. The signiﬁcant long run welfare eﬀects, for the EU and Japan
deserve some comments. They are mainly due to the adjustment of the contribution ceiling for
social security contributions. The higher capital inﬂows increase labor supply, average income
and the contribution ceiling in the EU and Japan. Consequently, top income households pay
more contributions into the system, although the contribution rate falls. This explains the long
run redistribution from rich to poor and medium income households.
233. Doubling Low-Skilled Immigration in the U.S.
Next we assume, as in the previous reform, that U.S. immigration is increased from 1 to
2 million people, but that the increase occurs only with respect to low-skilled immigrants. The
fourth panel in tables 3-5 shows the eﬀect of this policy, particularly the fact that compared
with the baseline simulation, it raises payroll and wage tax rates substantially and lowers real
wages. This reﬂects the nature of the U.S. state pension system, which provides beneﬁts on a
progressive basis and imposes a ceiling on earnings subject to payroll taxation. These features
make low-skilled immigrants so expensive that they fail to pay for themselves either with respect
to revenue generation or with respect to the accumulation of capital. As the fourth panel shows,
the long-run payroll tax rate is 2.1 percentage points higher and the average wage tax rate is
7.1 percentage points higher than in the base case. In addition, real wages end up 2 percentage
points lower. This translates into more than an 11 percent decline in long-run after-tax real
pay compared with the baseline.
As table 8 shows, this immigration policy is not only bad when measured by changes
in macroeconomic variables. It’s also quite bad when measured in terms of welfare changes.
Indeed, for the low-skilled U.S. cohort born in 2030, the welfare loss is 7.03 percent. For the
middle-skilled cohort born in that year, the loss is 6.68 percent. And for that birth year’s
high-skilled cohort, the loss is 2.67 percent.
Increasing low-skilled immigration turns out not only to be a bad idea for the U.S., but
it’s also a bad ideal for the EU and Japan. The long-run decline in capital intensitivity and real
wages visits non-trivial welfare losses on the lowest and middle-skilled cohorts born in 2030 in
the EU and Japan.
4. Doubling High-Skilled Immigration in the U.S.
Our next experiment entails doubling from 100,000 to 200,000 the number of high-skilled
immigrants assumed to enter the U.S. each year. This is obviously a very major increase
in the number of skilled immigrants, but represents only a 10 percent overall rise in U.S.
immigration. This, however, counts only bodies. By assumption, high-skilled agents are four
24times as productive as low-skilled workers. So doubling the number of high-skilled immigrants
constitutes a larger increase in total eﬀective labor supply.
Compared with our previous immigration policies, this policy comes out on top in terms
of its mitigation of future tax hikes. It also leaves long-run real wages somewhat higher than
would otherwise be the case. Compared with the base case, the long-run U.S. payroll tax rate
is now 26.4 percent instead of 27.4 percent. More importantly, the long-run average wage tax
rate is 10.8 percent rather than 13.3 percent. And, as shown in Table 9, future Americans
of all skill levels and, indeed, future low- and middle-skilled Europeans and Japanese beneﬁt
from this policy. In the case of low-skilled Americans born in 2030, the welfare gain is 3.53
percent. For their European and Japanese contemporaries the welfare gains are .77 percent
and .78 percent, respectively.
5. Doubling Immigration by Elderly in the US
Our ﬁnal immigration reform is inspired by Lundborg and Segerstrom (2002) who consider
a policy that restricts immigration to workers with signiﬁcant asset holdings. Since in our
model elderly immigrants arrive in their destination country with signiﬁcant assets, increasing
the number of elderly immigrants is a way to explore the eﬀect of letting immigrants ”buy their
way in.” In our experiment we double the 10 percent oldest immigrants to the U.S.
This policy turns out to have very little eﬀect on any of the three economies or on the
welfare of their current or future citizens. The intuition is that there are simply too few elderly
immigrants, even when their number is doubled, to materially alter the overall world wide
capital-labor ratio.
VI. Conclusion
This paper asks whether immigration can alleviate the ﬁscal burden and capital shortage
facing the developed world as it embarks on its dramatic demographic transition. Our ﬁndings
are discouraging. Immigration per se, no matter how large, will do essentially nothing to help
the developed world because every dollar, euro, or yen collected from new immigrants in taxes
25will be needed to provide them with public goods and social insurance beneﬁts. Moreover, if the
expansion of immigration is concentrated among the low skilled, the developed world’s ﬁscal
ﬁnances will deteriorate signiﬁcantly. The only policy that could help the developed world face
its demographic dilemma is expanding high skilled immigration. But massive increases in high
skilled immigration would be required for such a policy to have a meaningful impact. Where
would such immigrants come from? The answer is the underdeveloped world. But whether the
developing world has a suﬃcient number of such workers willing to immigrate remains an open
question as does the developing world’s willingness to exacerbate what is to them already a
very costly brain drain.
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Figure 5: Dependency ratio (60-90/20-59)
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time preference rate θ 0.02
intertemporal elasticity of substitution γ 0.25
intratemporal elasticity of substitution ρ 0.4
leisure preference parameter α 1.5
Production function
technology level φ 1.05461
capital share in production ε 0.25
adjustment cost parameter ψ 10.0
technical progress λ 0.01
Policy parameters
consumption tax rate (in %) τc 11.3 19.5 5.0
capital tax rate (in %) τr 20.0
debt (in % of NI) B/Y 40 50 44
age of retirement 63 60 60
30Table 2: The year 2000 of the baseline path*
Model Oﬃcial**
USA EU Japan USA EU Japan
National Income
private consumption 77.4 69.4 78.7 77.6 67.8 67.8
government purchases of goods and services 22.8 32.9 22.4 23.0 32.1 33.4
net investment -0.5 -1.6 -2.8
current account 0.2 -1.2 3.1 -4.6 -0.4 3.0
national saving rate 3.1 4.1 4.1 2.8 6.3 5.6
Government indicators
aggregate education outlays 5.9 6.0 4.4 5.9 6.0 4.3
aggregate pension beneﬁts 5.9 11.4 10.8 5.7 11.6 10.8
aggregate health beneﬁts 2.1 6.4 5.2 2.5 6.2 6.8
aggregate disability beneﬁts 1.3 - - 0.9 - -
pension contribution rate (in %) 8.8 16.9 16.5 10.6 - 17.3
health care contribution rate (in %) 2.8 9.6 8.0 2.9 - 8.0
disability insurance contribution rate (in %) 1.9 - - 1.9 - -
interest payment on public debt 3.6 4.5 4.0 4.2 4.5 4.0
Tax revenues 22.3 30.3 20.9 26.6 32.5 20.7
direct taxes 13.6 16.8 17.0 17.9 16.5 10.5
indirect taxes 8.7 13.5 3.9 8.7 16.0 10.2
Wage tax rates (in %)
average 10.0 14.2 14.1
marginal 17.0 19.7 20.2
capital output ratio 3.2 3.2 3.3
interest rate (in %) 9.0 -





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































37Table 6: Welfare Eﬀects of Doubling Immigration in all Regions
USA EU Japan
Income class Income class Income class
Birth year 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
1910 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.20 0.11 0.04 0.22 0.09 0.02
1920 0.18 0.14 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.16 0.11 0.09
1930 0.23 0.19 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.11 0.24 0.17 0.10
1940 0.27 0.23 0.17 0.25 0.20 0.13 0.27 0.22 0.17
1950 0.14 0.19 0.18 0.24 0.23 0.18 0.23 0.22 0.19
1960 -0.21 -0.02 0.10 0.07 0.15 0.17 0.06 0.14 0.17
1970 0.01 0.09 0.11 0.16 0.21 0.16 0.07 0.14 0.15
1980 0.38 0.31 0.13 0.54 0.45 0.15 0.20 0.21 0.11
1990 0.53 0.43 0.10 1.30 1.04 0.20 0.52 0.45 0.12
2000 0.97 0.78 0.22 2.64 2.17 0.35 1.08 0.89 0.13
2010 1.18 0.93 0.27 4.44 3.83 0.63 1.93 1.64 0.16
2020 1.17 0.90 0.22 5.42 4.74 0.86 2.94 2.57 0.21
2030 1.58 1.16 0.34 5.85 5.06 1.10 3.40 2.95 0.30
Table 7: Welfare Eﬀects of Doubling Immigration in the U.S.
USA EU Japan
Income class Income class Income class
Birth year 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
1910 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.15 0.09 0.03 0.17 0.08 0.02
1920 0.12 0.10 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.06
1930 0.14 0.12 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.15 0.10 0.06
1940 0.16 0.14 0.09 0.15 0.12 0.08 0.16 0.13 0.11
1950 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.11
1960 -0.24 -0.09 0.02 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.05 0.09 0.10
1970 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.09 -0.01 0.04 0.08
1980 0.42 0.31 0.09 -0.02 0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.05
1990 0.61 0.46 0.08 -0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.09 -0.05 0.03
2000 1.07 0.84 0.22 -0.08 -0.06 0.02 -0.14 -0.11 0.00
2010 1.27 1.01 0.29 -0.05 -0.07 -0.02 -0.15 -0.16 -0.05
2020 1.25 0.97 0.26 0.19 0.12 -0.05 0.06 0.00 -0.11
2030 1.62 1.20 0.36 0.45 0.33 -0.07 0.36 0.24 -0.14
38Table 8: Welfare Eﬀects of Doubling Low-Skilled Immigration in the U.S.
USA EU Japan
Income class Income class Income class
Birth year 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
1910 0.17 0.11 0.03 0.12 0.07 0.02 0.13 0.06 0.02
1920 0.14 0.08 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.04
1930 0.13 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03
1940 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04
1950 -0.41 -0.05 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03
1960 -1.46 -0.21 -0.02 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03
1970 -0.85 -0.48 -0.14 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03
1980 -0.32 -0.80 -0.30 0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.02
1990 -1.54 -1.60 -0.61 -0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.04
2000 -2.71 -2.61 -0.99 -0.08 -0.02 0.07 -0.08 -0.01 0.08
2010 -4.30 -3.79 -1.44 -0.26 -0.14 0.11 -0.24 -0.11 0.13
2020 -6.04 -5.20 -2.05 -0.49 -0.31 0.16 -0.51 -0.31 0.20
2030 -7.03 -6.68 -2.67 -0.78 -0.52 0.22 -0.82 -0.54 0.30
Table 9: Welfare Eﬀects of Doubling High-Skilled Immigration in the U.S.
USA EU Japan
Income class Income class Income class
Birth year 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
1910 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.00
1920 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02
1930 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02
1940 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03
1950 0.09 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
1960 0.16 0.11 -0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
1970 0.28 0.20 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01
1980 0.44 0.32 0.15 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1990 0.88 0.66 0.23 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.02
2000 1.51 1.14 0.45 0.07 0.02 -0.05 0.04 -0.01 -0.06
2010 2.17 1.64 0.64 0.21 0.11 -0.09 0.16 0.05 -0.12
2020 2.84 2.14 0.85 0.47 0.31 -0.13 0.44 0.26 -0.18
2030 3.53 2.65 1.19 0.77 0.54 -0.16 0.78 0.53 -0.23
39Table 10: Welfare Eﬀects of Doubling Elderly Immigration in the U.S.
USA EU Japan
Income class Income class Income class
Birth year 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
1910 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.01
1920 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01
1930 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
1940 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
1950 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
1960 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.01
1970 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.01
1980 -0.06 -0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.01
1990 -0.18 -0.13 -0.03 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.02 -0.01
2000 -0.31 -0.24 -0.07 0.06 0.04 -0.01 0.06 0.05 -0.01
2010 -0.39 -0.31 -0.10 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.06 0.00
2020 -0.43 -0.34 -0.12 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.00
2030 -0.44 -0.35 -0.13 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.00
40